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Abstract: 
What we learn from history is that thought and knowledge and their often unarticulated 
assumptions are not hermeneutically sealed off from the hopes and dreams or ordinary people, or 
from a nation and its leaders seeking to bring forth a democratic vision. Innocuous as it may seem 
today, the utilitarian doctrine of the 19th century brought forward as American pragmatism bears 
out attention. This so-called ethical theory finding its roots in the Enlightenment as reason was being 
flushed from its medieval and religious influences, but had a disguised and, philosophically, 
unarticulated meaning. Perhaps put forth as a defense of reason over faith, but now, in the throes of 
the Industrial Revolution, and threatened by the Great Awakening and Christian fundamentalism, 
intellectuals were searching for a practical way of promoting science and its technological 
developments. Now redefined, pragmatism was put forward as an ethical principle, but the popular 
mantle, “the greatest good for the greatest number” revealed an unspoken belief that minorities 
didn’t count, especially “blacks”, who were thought of as mentally and culturally unable to carry 
forward the economic and democratic successes flourishing in Europe and America. In broad 
strokes, this article identifies the veiled assumptions of utilitarianism and pragmatism that today 
underlies the American moral crisis, emanating from pulpit, pew, and the hallowed halls of 
Congress. This may have been an unattended consequence, but it is real nonetheless. 
Keywords: assumptions, culture, epistemic, ethnocentric, essences, human rights, hope, intrinsic, 
mind, normative, pragmatism, pre-rational beliefs, sentiments, theism, utilitarians. 
Introduction 
Ideologically (from a political, cultural, or religious point of view), the nation we so fondly 
call “America” was in part a creation of the influence of myth and fact, reason and hope, fear and 
anxiety. As these cultural forces were overlapping and bumping into one another, the ideal of 
American democracy was taking shape. Seemingly, today, without rudder or anchor we have 
succumbed to an unprincipled and unthinking trajectory making drilling down to the foundations 
of our values, our democratic culture, both complicated and treacherous. As this history becomes 
more remote, it leaves an ever-widening gap to be filled in by old stories and beliefs. These, says A. 
C. Grayling, “are so much easier to understand, and provide the neat narrative structure – beginning, 
middle, end, and purpose – that human psychology loves.” (Grayling, 2016, 323) 
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As we most assuredly know, our myths, including the veiled assumptions about our 
genealogical past, cannot be dispelled by facts alone. They lie quietly within and operate in the 
background of our logic and beliefs hidden deep inside with an emotional force helping us to get our 
bearings in a world of confusing ethical messages. Many remain in denial about their veiled cultural 
assumptions, living in the popular ideologies of the present ignoring history past. The psychological 
and social (cultural) factors that reinforce prejudice, a politics of bigotry, or a culture of freedom and 
dignity for all are difficult to admit and even more challenging to identify. Like it or not, we are our 
beliefs, our values, and they live quietly within us often as a collective opinion providing reassurance, 
considered natural and difficult to vanquish. 
In broad strokes, this article attempts to lay bare several clues to this dilemma. This will not 
only be found in the uneasy balance of faith and reason, emanating from the European 
Enlightenment, but in the seemingly innocuous mantle of a pragmatic philosophy touted generally 
as “The American Philosophy” with its call to arms, “the greatest good for the greatest number.”1 
Looking through the veil of “white” eyes, this statement seems innocent enough, but a closer look 
reveals its masking the assumption of “white supremacy” driving life and politics in the 19th century 
and remains a serendipitous energy weaving our political and religious convictions in the 21st century 
in uneasy affiliations. 
As America became the center of scientific and industrial achievement, the utility of reason 
was promoted as common sense and pragmatic, as it was, but uniquely moral is was not. Utility or 
pragmatism provides no ethical content and has a tendency to float in the contaminated air of 
political expediency and an ill-defined hope that whatever is deemed by the majority as politically or 
socially important will eventually morph into what Dewey called “human flourishing”, the best kind 
of life a person can live and what it entails. (Dewey 2008, 87-95) Looking through the eyes of 
minorities, “human flourishing” takes on a different and unexpected meaning. Referring to 
President Trump’s treating the entire nation as black, Michael Dyson says, “After a great deal of 
resistance, combat, and protest, some white folk have come around to seeing race, especially this 
brand of whiteness, as a fiction, something Baldwin said more than 50 years ago. Many whites now 
see the truth because they believe that what Trump is doing is deeply and profoundly flawed, even 
lunatic. His obsessions and perverse preoccupations are the stuff of a whiteness that never had to be 
held accountable. Trump’s total lack of knowledge, and the enshrinement of ignorance in the basis 
of power and authority is the personification of white supremacy and white arrogance.” (Dyson 
2018, 63-64)
With the rise of Christian fundamentalism in the 19th and 20th centuries, a clash inevitably 
occurred. The more secular promoted the utility of reason leaving their faith in the rear of their 
ethical musings as only a patina directing their discourse. For the more religiously inclined, belief in 
God and the Scriptures became the criteria of truth and morals. But as we know, belief in God is no 
guarantee against prejudice and unprincipled behaviors. In the 19th century, faith and reason – a 
combustible duo – were firmly fixed into a so-called “American Philosophy” pushed forward by a 
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spirit of conquest and industry, supporting slavery and, in our time, discrimination against 
minorities. In time, hotbed issues such as the feminist movement, integration, same-sex marriage, 
homosexual inclusion, and now the immigration crisis would bring American ethical beliefs into 
contact and reveal their tensions and differences. 
The causal links supporting this interpretation are difficult to procure, but just ask, “What 
if I’m in the minority?” How then does the “greatest good for the greatest number fit into my life 
and does it support universal human rights and benevolence?” Philosophically and historically are 
views and actions of decent people supporting a universal view of humanity and the dignity it 
compels.2 (Taylor 2001, 23; see also, Meacham 2018) In broad strokes, we are challenged to assess 
the neglected and often hidden assumptions of the “the greatest good…” mantle which has caused 
and is causing a dialogical failure blurring the edges of ethical discussion and moral genuineness. 
Looking back, our history is replete with presidents and politicians, ministers and ordinary folks 
struggling with their own personal and national identity. Strong is the hold of the past as its myths 
and atrocities are often reinterpreted and justified camouflaging their amoral assumptions. 
Recommended is searching for a common ethic that does justice to these shared opinions and, 
guided by hope, using the power of reassessment as an instrument of dialogical healing. 
 
Pre-Rational Assumptions and the Inadequacies of Utilitarianism and Theism 
Conspicuously, our cultural, often pre-rational beliefs and assumptions are revealed in the 
language we use and in the language we choose, and, importantly, in the normative force our words 
imply. Culture and its often unarticulated grammar constitute the normative reality in which we 
live. It is a defining aspect of what it means to be human. But, pinpointing the impact of culture and 
its assumed but often unarticulated moral intentions is not as straightforward as it seems. Terry 
Eagleton comments, “Culture, like civilizations, involves material institutions; but it can also be seen 
as a primarily spiritual phenomenon, and as such, can pass judgment on social, political and 
economic activity. It is less under the sway of utility than civilization, less hamstrung by pragmatic 
considerations.” (Eagleton 2016, 18) Given our cultural disparities, any ethic – secular or religious – 
to be effective must harbor a wide stance (Daniels, 1979, 256-282) and gather into its wicker many 
dissimilar views to unveil our common humanity and to lay bare the ethical vision that sustains us. 
For this reason, a reductionist ethic – either materialistic or theistic – misses the depth of the 
humanity that we are. It ignores the definitive value-suppositions of our cultural dissimilarities, and, 
within the practicalities of politics and everyday life, resulting in name-calling, labels, and caricatures. 
Building walls around our beliefs not only shuts others out, they also encapsulate us within a narrow 
view of the rights and dignity of others.   
Both science and religion are replete with unspoken, often hidden, and seldom discussed 
beliefs. From a moral point of view, these assumptions are antecedal to the conclusions drawn about 
the sources and foundation of ethics. Thus, ethics, both secular and religious, emit an iffy quality 
with reference to that which has yet-to-be-discovered and/or confirmed, the motives and unspoken 
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values they entail, and, especially, the decision or indecision to follow a recognized ethical rule or 
intuitive ethical belief. These involve interpretations of the real and recognized—the physical and 
social nature of human living and the cultural expectations by which we direct our lives. And 
although empiricism is the hallmark of science and scientific utilitarianism, important to ethics is 
what is unspoken and assumed as much as what is said and placed in theoretical discourse. And what 
engrained suppositions do the faithful bring to this discussion? Belief-in partakes of absolutism, 
looks back to ancient authorities for truth and guidance, and projects what many consider to be an 
untenable (mythological) future. Faith can be uplifting, but it can also be demeaning and deceitful. 
Of course, just as we cannot build a bridge from faith to certainty, we cannot build from logic a 
bridge from fact to value, from isness to oughtness. Ethics is and remains a precarious undertaking. 
We are quick to judge a theory, or an idea, by a theoretical misstep by an over-zealous 
theoretician. Nothing written goes forward with unblemished simplicity. But in our judgments, we 
often forget the kernel of insight they have brought forth. Despite his misjudgment about our hidden 
moral grammar, Marc Hauser’s3 assumptions require our attention. This will entail a search for the 
“hidden grammar” of moral discourse, the unspoken assumptions that drive our conclusions. This 
we should consider in both ethics and science. Whether this grammar is biological or cultural, 
intuitive, or determined by a belief structure remains to be determined and its complications are 
obvious. Rational discourse is prized by both the faithful and those espousing a scientific view of the 
world. Revealed in both is “hope” as a guiding metaphor for their discussions of ethics. Given our 
differences, understanding depends on our being able to communicate our values openly and 
consistently.4  
The Utility of Reason 
Digging deeper into both utilitarian and religious literature – not shutting down our inquiry 
– remains a challenge. An examination of the “utility” of reason, especially moral reasoning
advocated by utilitarians, provides a hint to the presuppositions guiding much contemporary 
inquiry into ethics and the open dialogue recommended. Understanding the epistemic 
complications of ethics and guided by an excessive belief in the power of scientific knowledge and 
techniques when applied to ethics, utilitarian Richard Rorty (1999, 23 ff.) recommends we replace 
talk about “knowledge” – trying to know reality as it “really” is – with “hope”. This was his final 
word on ethics, but what lies behind this suggestion? Rorty’s epistemological skepticism is obvious 
as he seeks to avoid discussing anything that smacks of the intrinsic. Acknowledging doubts about 
absolute knowledge and knowledge of the innate and intuitive, he appears to abandon his utility 
hypothesis and floats aimlessly in the ethereal notion of “hope.” 
  “Hope” is a metaphor expressing what could be, but is not, a pressing vision of the future, 
driving our thinking with unarticulated suppositions and, in Rorty’s case, premises. Understanding 
the metaphorical and perhaps intrinsic nature of hope we are able to uncover the hidden conjectures 
of Rorty’s theory of knowledge (itself a metaphor) as he dispenses with much of Platonic and 
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Cartesian metaphysics replacing the “supposed reality” behind “reality” with plain talk about the 
utility of knowledge as a means toward greater human well-being and happiness. From what 
unspoken ontological reservoir does he pull his idea of hope? Of course, there can’t be one for he 
denies the existence of “supposed reality.” And from where does the desire for pleasure and 
happiness originate? This “supposed reality”, the hopes and dreams of ordinary people, Rorty calls 
“essences” and defines as “nonsensical speech”, including belief, faith, God, mind, the reality of 
hidden assumptions, and anything that smacks of the human spirit. Although drawing on hope, he 
fails to mention that hope is also a “supposed reality”, as he says. 
  Examining the language of ethics through a scientific filter and pronouncing much in 
cultural discourse as “nonsense” is the veneer of utilitarian discourse. Thus, Rorty and those of the 
same ilk are satisfied with examining speech acts only, revealing the veiled supposition that only the 
physical is real, and that insight, belief, and perhaps even reason, which he prizes, are an unreality. 
From where do these spring? And if “mind” is metaphor only, as we suspect, does it have a referential 
stopping place? What correlation does it express, one of similarity or one of identity? And similar 
to what and identical to what? Confusingly, Rorty says, “If it makes any sense to speak of the 
existence of universals, it would seem that they must exist immaterially, and that is why they can never 
be identified with spatio-temporal particulars. I conclude that we cannot make non-spatiality the 
criterion of mental states, if only because the notion of ‘state’ is sufficiently obscure that neither the 
term ‘spatial state’ nor the term ‘nonspatial state’ seems useful.” Obscured in this statement are the 
epistemic assumptions lying at the foundation of his utilitarianism. Using the criteria of “utility”, 
Rorty dispels with the intrinsic revealing a bare epistemic physicalism. (Rorty 1979, 20-24) Upon 
deeper inspection, utilitarianism is a moral theory its own methods cannot confirm or disconfirm 
leaving us in a bottleneck of contradictions. 
  Charles Taylor, a critic of utilitarian theory, says, “The notion is never that whatever we do 
is acceptable. This would be unintelligible as the basis of a notion of dignity. Rather, the key point 
is that the higher is to be found not outside of but as a manner of living ordinary life. For the 
Reformers this manner was defined theologically; for classical utilitarians, in terms of (instrumental) 
rationality. For Marxists, the expressivist element of free self-creation is added to Enlightenment 
rationality. But in all cases, some distinction is maintained between the higher, the admirable life and 
the lower life of sloth, irrationality, slavery, or alienation.” (Taylor 2001, 23) What Taylor seeks in 
any moral theory is an affirmation of the ordinary life. He says, “The notion that the life of 
production and reproduction, of work and the family, is the main locus of the good life flies in the 
face of that were originally the dominant distinctions of our civilization. For both the warrior ethic 
and the Platonic, ordinary life in this sense is part of the lower range, part of what contrasts with the 
incomparably higher. The affirmation of the ordinary life, therefore, involves a polemical stance 
towards these traditional views and their implied elitism.” This he says is carried over and transposed 
in secular guise “which powers the reductive views like utilitarianism which wants to denounce all 
qualitative distinctions.” Then, are we left, as Karl Jaspers reminds us, “[with]… no firm ground 
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under us, no principle to hold on to, but a suspension of thought in infinite space – without shelter 
in conceptual systems, without refuge in firm knowledge or faith. And even this suspended, floating 
structure of thought is only one metaphor of being among others.”5 (Jaspers 1997, 187-188) 
 Hovering behind much utilitarian and pragmatic talk is the assumption of “the greatest good 
for the greatest number”, but only in terms of its utility value for the greatest number. Clothed 
underneath these words was not hope only, but hope for the majority and fear of the minority. In 
the closing years of the 19th century in America, as John Meacham writes, “Whites reigned supreme.” 
During that time, Justice John Marshall Harlan in the aftermath of Plessy v. Ferguson wrote, “The 
white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country… But in the view of the Constitution, 
in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant ruling class of citizens.” 
(Meacham 2018, 68-69) Thus, historically and in the minds of many, as the 19th century was drawing 
to a close, the utilitarian thinking, which had now morphed into pragmatism and the idea of 
“manifest destiny”, and based on a belief in white supremacy, was confounding the waters of 
equality, freedom, and justice for all supporting first, slavery, and then discrimination against people 
of color and many other ethnically different and foreign people flowing into America.  
 Theoretically, for utilitarians, happiness as “the good” is ill-defined except by reference to 
“the greatest number” leaving their ethic and that of pragmatism as only an expedient way of 
thinking and behaving. Expediency alone – what is good for the majority – became a justification, 
in the minds of many, for racism, anti-Semitism, and the like, but omits the veiled assumption that 
“happiness for the majority (rich, white, and powerful) ought to be pursued.” Looking more 
carefully at utilitarian theory, “happiness” and its “implied ought” are pre-rational suppositions, 
normative and not descriptive only, and antecedental to their idea of social hope. In retrospect, this 
was not the happiness talked about by Aristotle, that life finds meaning and purpose within human 
relationships that the good of the whole is crucial to the genuine well-being of the individual. 
Happiness, says Aristotle, is something we choose for its own sake because it is a universal impulse 
in all humans. Happiness is not a “means” to something else. 
 Ironically, pragmatism was decreed as “the American philosophy” but carried with it the 
unspoken assumption of fear that minorities would gain a public voice. Thus, it veiled the deeper 
negative values of the American heart and spirit. Still, today, pragmatism has a certain “common 
sense” hold on the American psyche bringing forth unexpected and, perhaps, unintended 
consequences. But what those who still hold onto this doctrine are discovering is that words that 
flash on a screen or actions that have no moral foundation in human decency can’t adequately 
display the unspoken tremors of the heart or dispel the energy alive in those seeking, what Jefferson 
described as happiness, freedom, and equality for all. Some utilitarians have tried, expressing a social 
hope couched in the words of the Golden Rule, but this remains a vain and inadequate attempt.
(Rorty 1999, 23 ff.)
 I think it honest to ask, “Have some in America lost their hold on what is truth and what is 
morally right and decent?” Reading the words, “Let’s make America great again”, we see that the 
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problem of our moral identity is still with us today. We wonder to what era in our past is being 
referred to in these words. It is a truism that most history is what people choose to believe, hiding 
their knowledge under the veil of their assumptions. This may just be the key to unraveling our 
current political situation. There is no mystery in this for we live in the genetic and social fabric of 
our past the flux of which often hides our motives and intentional activities. This amoral trajectory 
didn’t start yesterday or in 2015; it began long ago and now we are suffering its unintended 
consequences. 
  Unarguably, G. E. Moore is in agreement with utilitarian theory. He says, “All moral laws, I 
wish to show, are merely statements that certain kinds of actions will have good effects. (…) What I 
wish first to point out is that ‘right’ does and can mean nothing but ‘cause of a good result’, and is 
thus identical with ‘useful’: whence it follows that the end always will justify the means and that no 
action which is not justified by its results can be right.” (More 1960, 196) What Moore leaves us to 
explain is “what is a good result?” How is “good” to be defined? How would we know anyway? 
Strangely, Moore’s view is echoed by William James who commented out of practical necessity, “The 
true, to put it briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as the right is only the 
expedient in the way of our behaving.” (“Pragmatic Theory of Truth” 1969, 427-428) 
  Philosophers often leave us in a values-confusion. Moore’s “statements of a certain kind,” 
and James’ “expedient” are concepts weighted with pre-rational postulations – unspoken 
suppositions about the nature of good, right, and true. When applied to the majority only, their 
meanings become clear as the mantle of “white supremacy” was a weighted scale favoring the rich 
and the powerful. To be sure, “truth” often finds its articulation in logic and science and is closely 
aligned with “fact,” but “good” and “right” find their meaning in the unspoken genealogy of our 
cultural histories. Upon examination, we are caught in a language quagmire of metaphor swapping 
leading to a slippery slope of meaningless dialogue. 
  Lying behind the utilitarian hypothesis (like any theory) is a concept of “culture”, a concept 
that appears plainly descriptive but is not, as utilitarians slip in prescriptivism under the covers of 
their “greatest good” hypothesis. Yes, we can study and describe culture(s), but the culture that “we” 
are is often obscured by our moral grammar and swings unperceptively with prescriptive force and 
many times articulated as “social hope”. Revealing our expectations culture includes, among other 
things, the elusive normative values driving our lives. Language is often deceptive, as referring to our 
inherent physical nature only may state a fact or it can formulate a value judgment, one that limits 
our discussions to what is perceived and ignores that which is intrinsic, intuitive, or based on belief. 
What we have in utilitarianism is a narrowing of culture using one version of culture as his source. 
This is a classic circular argument, perhaps engorged by a genetic fallacy, but in the end, most of our 
arguments are circular involving the presuppositions that are antecedal to our conclusions. 
  We often ignore this, including the social results of an insulated philosophical theory. 
Mostly, philosophers are content with picking through the entrails of an argument and revealing its 
consistencies or inconsistencies. We attend to its logic and not its social implications. Those 
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espousing utility and expediency as a measure of truth and morals have begged the question of 
slavery, of reconstruction, the wave of immigrants coming into America at the end of the 19th 
century, and the nature of humanity itself. Although rooted in moral theory, utility, as the sole judge 
of what is “right” and “good” became “what works”. While the idea of “good” was never adequately 
defined, this bland moral conundrum supported our capitalistic impulse while limping into our 
consciousness as “the great American philosophy” often defined as “the greatest good for the greatest 
number.” 
 Morality as utility has a reductive effect making ethics just another commodity that we may 
or may not pursue. We are reminded of this by the phrase “Let the buyer beware” uncovering an 
amoral foundation to capitalism, an economic driver of Democracy. There has always been an 
uneasy and trepid balance between capitalism and democracy. Keep in mind that logic and reason 
cannot and do not create our values; their purpose is to add clarity and consistency. Our values have 
a different place of origin than simple utility. And, again, we must remember that the origin of our 
values in no way constitutes their justification. Calling upon the origins of our beliefs, either 
epistemological or religious, begs the question of their meaning, content, and moral significance. It 
is similar to an ad hominem fallacy leveraging existing negative perceptions to make someone's 
argument look bad, without actually presenting a case for why the argument itself lacks merit. This 
is something the religious should understand when calling on the authority of God or Scripture as a 
means of justification or labeling those who disagree with their religious beliefs as atheists or 
agnostics and their political beliefs as traitors. Utilitarians are correct on this point and it’s a point of 
simple logical reasoning, but they too have this problem when denying the inward nature, true 
substance, or constitution of anything, as opposed to what is accidental, phenomenal, illusory, or 
material. 
Religious Absolutism and the Lack of Dialogical Conversation 
 Reasons are required in the throes of dialogical conversation to support our choice of values 
from the cultural mixture that is us. This never occurs automatically and absolutism, as found in 
many religious values, is not sufficient to convince. Absolutism, in religion and in politics is the ethos 
of the ego, not the community; it has no universal appeal as it favors a one-sided interpretation of 
belief, political policy, or the Constitution. (Meacham 2018, 68) Absolutism is revealed as a top-
down directive, singularly interpreted, and has a slippery slope effect as it herds the many into its 
wicker. But ethics and civility are often unarticulated cultural norms requiring our constant 
diligence, dialectical interaction, and moral leadership. Meacham writes that President Lincoln gave 
us a leadership of hope and progress, but Andrew Johnson failed in this regard playing the white 
supremacy card and catering to his white southern constituency. (Meacham 2018, 62) An ethic of 
hope opens both heart and mind to a future of human dignity for all. A reductionist ethic, faith-
based or utilitarian, is hope-denying. Also, care must be taken for as Oswald Spengler6 reminds, all 
cultures eventually petrify and externalize themselves into civilizations which suggest a decline from 
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the organic to the mechanical. This we find in both utilitarian theory and religious practices, as both 
the secular and religious ethic are transposed into a sterile mechanical impulse, a utility value only. 
Given the liturgical practices of the faithful, a mechanical, perfunctory ethic appears to stain their 
ideals of right, fair, justice, and decency as well.  
  Civilizations evolve, not mechanically, but through the ideals, creativity, and decisions of 
people, as John Stuart Mill says, through… 
…the multiplication of physical comforts; the advance and diffusion of knowledge; the decay of 
superstition; the facilities of mutual intercourse; the softening of manners; the decline of war and 
personal conflict; the progressive limitation of the tyranny of the strong over the weak; the great 
works accomplished throughout the world by the co-operation of multitudes.(Eggleston 2010, 
266) 
  Given Mill’s definition, the slogan “Let’s make America great again” strains both our 
consciousness and our knowledge. The history being referred to by the word “again” is seen by many 
in only their peripheral vision, not quite myth, and not quite fact. It submits to varied 
interpretations. When confronting this slogan, we are faced with the conundrum: what does it mean 
to be an American within the diversity that America is and always has been given the hodgepodge of 
its genetic history, social activities, and traditions? Probing even deeper we discover that the 19th-
century phrase “manifest destiny” referred only to whites and excluded all others. This too can be 
linked to utilitarian doctrine as people of color (minorities) – Native Americans, Africans, Asians, 
and Hispanics – have been and are being pushed out of the way, by policy and violence, by white 
Americans hell-bent and destined – by God, some say – to secure their dominance as if white 
supremacy is Constitutionally demanded. This remains a veiled assumption in pulpit, pew, and the 
halls of Congress, state and federal. It seems that the pre-Enlightenment mind of religious myth and 
fundamentalism is today an activity in control of many lives in and outside of America. Again, it is 
the self-consciousness and unselfconsciousness of experience in our time that can explain this. 
  Especially important to the concept of culture is Ernst Bloch’s introduction of the 
ontological priority of the “not-yet”, of becoming, of what might happen sometime in the future 
suggesting that we are a people in the making; we are not a finished product. “It is therefore not”, 
says Dennis J. Schmidt his translator, “the static or finished self-identity of concepts but their 
dynamic relativity to other concepts that lets them be meaningful or intelligible” (Bloch 1986, xii-
xiii). This dynamic relativity suggests a more expansive notion of ethics preferable to one that is 
narrow, legalistic, self-centered, logic-based, scientific, or religiously one-sided. Ethics, which 
pursues human equality, happiness, and responsibility for all – which views the self as it views others 
and which asks not what it is right to do but what it is good to do – cannot be allowed to decay on the 
horns on an unsustainable view of American exceptionalism or be diminished by unreasonable self-
interest, the narrow absolutism of religious doctrine, or a survival-of-the-fittest hypothesis implied 
in neo-Darwinian ethics ignoring the least among us. Morality is an affirmation of everyday life, the 
commonplace, and the normal; and, as Kant reminds us, owes nothing to the order of nature less we 
Humanities Bulletin, Volume 1, Number 2, 2018 
129 
forget the dignity of life as it is lived. (Taylor 2001, 83-84) Thus, ethics and the moral impulse which 
lies at its heart are organic – natural, alive and growing within each person seeking a non-
dehumanizing expression in equality, freedom, and happiness for all. 
 Rorty correctly says that the ideas and arguments of philosophers, theologians, educators, 
and scientists are embedded in a morass of unstated beliefs and assumptions. The clarity of their 
statements, the logic of their arguments, and the axiomatic assumptions guiding their theories 
provide only an illusion of objectivity. With this I am in agreement for we more often than not 
project our values onto the events of our day and into our descriptions of such events including their 
causes. When “utility” and “belief-in” become an uncompromising foundation for ethical values, 
we are required to dig a bit deeper. They both represent an objectivity-illusion, the hidden 
assumptions of which have yet to be overcome. More often than not, both utilitarians and theists 
slip in prescriptivism under the covers of their ontological hypotheses, revealing a theory of what 
ought to be rather than what is. (Jacoby 2018, 76-77) 
 E.A. Burtt7 (1965, 28) notes that presuppositions are the given – the intuitively given – we 
present to reality that in turn modify reality and become reality itself. We tend to shape our moral 
views, perhaps unaware of their cultural origins, by our own cultural genealogy. “The greatest good 
for the greatest number” as the assumed culture of the majority was the “there” that was “there” but 
not-yet fully realized or openly stated except by a few; yet, plainly articulated in various views of 
white supremacy. (See: Meacham 2018. See chapters 1 & 2, 23-79, especially quoting Thomas W. 
Dixon who said, “The white man must reign supreme.”) We sometimes get a peek at these 
presuppositions through the language of discourse and argument as they garnish our emotions with 
a quiet motivational quality, but ever so often they remain unarticulated so as not to reveal their 
intended consequences. Sometimes they are just unconscious utterances (habits of the mind and 
heart) ingrained in our cultural heritage to which we give little thought. 
 Ideologically (from a political, cultural, or religious point of view), the nation we so fondly 
call “America” was in part a creation of the influence of myth and fact, reason and hope, and fear 
and anxiety. As these forces were overlapping and bumping into one another, the ideal of American 
democracy was taking shape. The unspoken and often assumed tentacles of our history have enslaved 
us in seemly irresolvable ideologies. As we most assuredly know, our myths, including the veiled 
assumptions of our genealogical past, operate in the background of our logic and beliefs, hidden 
deep inside with an emotional force, helping us to get our bearings in a world of confusing ethical 
messages. The psychological and social (cultural) factors that reinforce prejudice and a politics of 
bigotry are difficult to admit and even more challenging to identify. Ironically and practically, the 
key finding common moral ground is held by us whom the past has enslaved. Unwittingly, perhaps 
knowingly, we have developed the skill to mask our moral beliefs and embed them in political 
loyalties, rhetoric, and ecclesiastical doctrine. We are now at the crossroads of choice: what would 
we have 21st century America to be? Admittedly, drilling down to the foundation of our values is 
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both complicated and treacherous, but this we must do to uncover the heart and moral power that 
is us. 
  Thus, presuppositions (our assumptions, beliefs, and conjectures) are a driving force – habits 
of expectation – pushing us to discover the causal links that complete the ethical and ontological 
principles they entail. But we often move along unconsciously and perform many everyday actions 
with only a vague conception of what we are up to, and with hindsight support our actions by the 
self-attribution of reasons. Reasons are thus procured and forced onto the stage of life as self-
vouching but are internally prejudiced, prejudiced by unarticulated and unjustified beliefs we bring 
to the table of dialogue. This dynamic relativity calls for discussion – the dialectic of conversation – 
for agreement and consistency to be sustained. It is through active communication, neither 
condemnation nor authoritarian pronouncements, where ethical meaning is to be discovered. 
 
In Conclusion 
  Harkening back to the beginnings of American democracy – a moral ideal – we understand 
that the American Revolution was influenced by the moderate wing of the Enlightenment, which 
embraced order, harmony, and a balance of faith and reason. Although Jefferson made Deism an 
essential part of the nation’s fabric when he appealed to “the laws of nature and nature’s God”, by 
the second half of the 20th century it was evident that Evangelicals had begun to battle this notion 
and reclaim America for “the God of the New Testament”. This narrowing once begun has been 
difficult to harness. Americans (and evangelicals in particular) remain confused and divided over the 
relationship of reason and faith, whether there can be a relationship or whether the one supplants 
the other. Americans remain a separated people, generally along secularists and theistic lines, but this 
is often veiled by their view of immigrants, especially Hispanics, and African-Americans. In a strange 
way, utility has united both the secularists and the religious in a conundrum of ethical assertions. 
Confounding America’s religious history is the fact that theism – belief in one supreme God – is 
represented by a strange mixture of beliefs and ideas, usually ignoring the hidden assumptions 
implied in our own Constitution, notably, “Nature’s God”(See: Stewart  2015). For Jefferson, 
“Nature’s God” was not the “God of the Bible”, but evangelicals continue to push their beliefs into 
its interpretation. This is an undercurrent seldom mentioned any more, but the 2016 presidential 
debates have demonstrated its continuing influence.8 (See: New 2012; Raeder 2017) 
  Noting these differences, the capacity for reassessment is perhaps our only hope of reaching a 
consensus, discovering truth or meaning, or bringing our discussion to a point of some agreement. 
In ethics it is not conclusions we seek; important also are the ethical meanings and the applications 
deeply embedded within our cultural histories. Ethical meaning is not only found in the concrete 
moment of decision-making where we bring our assumptions about what is right and what is wrong 
to bear on a tangible situation but in our vision of the morally possible. Looking back as we often 
do, it’s difficult to see where we have been. Our history can be perplexing. Our rearview mirrors 
provide only a narrow and restricted view of the past. To make America great, again and again, 
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requires our moral presence, not only in the moment but in our moral vision of the future and its 
applications in our lives. 
 Thus, ethics, if it is anything at all, is a precarious vision waiting for universal articulation. 
Within this muddle, our assumptions about right and wrong are moral visions and lifestyles to be 
lived, perhaps not absolute rules to obey. Rules change and commandments are archaic, but there is 
a staying quality about a universal ethical vision when articulated broadly and wisely, and with 
reason, avoiding ethnocentric domination. (See: Hester & Killian 1975) Accordingly, this will 
necessitate some honesty in revealing our assumptions about ethics and morals, trying to slide them 
aside as we give others the opportunity for individual expression and dialectical discourse. This will 
be more occasional and rare as you believe it to be for getting agreement on ethical issues is perhaps 
an impossible task. 
 So, is there any hope for some kind of ethical objectivity or for agreeing on a common and 
unified idea of “the good” and the behaviors it entails? Of course, this hope is only an ideal but it is 
an ideal to which we should aim. Charles Taylor explains is view of this hope, 
But our identity is deeper and more many-sided than any of our possible articulations of it. (…) this 
person [the utilitarian] doesn’t lack a framework. On the contrary, he has a strong commitment to a 
certain ideal of rationality and benevolence. He admires people who live up to this ideal, condemns 
those who fail or who are too confused even to accept it, feels wrong when he himself falls below it. 
The utilitarian lives within a moral horizon which cannot be explicated by his own moral theory. 
(Taylor 2001, 28-29) 
 In the same manner, Alasdair MacIntyre warns of the pretensions of “reason” as he 
comments in a long passage from his book, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, 
Descartes symbolized for the nineteenth-century encyclopaedist a declaration of independence by 
reason from the particular bonds of any particular moral and religious community. It is on this view 
of the essence of rationality that its objectivity is inseparable from its freedom from the partialities of 
all such communities. It is to allegiance to reason as such, impersonal, impartial, disinterested, uniting 
and universal, that the encyclopaedist summons his or her readers and hearers. And it is, of course, 
this very same conception of reason as universal and disinterested that the genealogist rejects, so that 
genealogist and encyclopaedist agree in framing what they take to be both exclusive and exhaustive 
alternatives. Either reason is thus impersonal, universal, and disinterested or it is the unwitting of 
particular interests, making their drive to power its false pretensions to neutrality and 
disinterestedness. (McIntyre 1990, 59) 
 McIntyre goes on to say, “To share in the rationality of a craft requires sharing in the 
contingencies of its history, understanding its story as one’s own, and finding a place for oneself as a 
character in the enacted dramatic narrative which is that story so far.” To this advice the theist should 
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attend and perhaps the utilitarian and New Atheist should peer over their own shoulders to get a 
glimpse of their own genealogical assumptions. 
  Maybe we should not despair but make an effort to keep our ethical conversations moving 
in a positive direction. As Raymond Williams says, 
 
 A culture, while it is being lived, is always in part unknown, in part unrealized. The making of a 
community is always an exploration, for consciousness cannot precede creation, and there is no formula 
for unknown experience. A good community, a living culture, will, because of this, not only make room 
for but actively encourage all and any who can contribute to the advance in consciousness which is the 
common need… We need to consider every attachment, every value, with our whole attention; for we do 
not know the future, we may never be certain of what may enrich us. (Williams, 1958, 334) 
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6. See: Spengler, Oswald, The Decline of the West, the Complete Edition, pages 104-106. Internet
Archive: https://archive.org/stream/Decline-Of-The-West-Oswald- 
Spengler/Decline_Of_The_West#page/n573/ mode/ 2up/search/ depopulation (1926).
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8. For a more complete discussion see: David New, Fundamentalism in America: A Cultural History
(Jefferson, NC: Mcfarland, 2012). Also see: https://news.gallup.com/poll/1690/religion.aspx and
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